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Ali Akbar, an Afghan pomegranate seller, arranges his produce
at the World Pomegranate Fair in Kabul, Afghanistan, on
November 20, 2008. Afghan officials have launched a marketing
campaign for the fruit in the hope that it will give farmers an
alternative to growing opium poppies.
The deteriorating situation
and local nature of the
insurgency now require
Western support for local
tribes, subtribes, and clans
to help establish order and
governance.




By Seth G. Jones
Seth Jones is a RAND political scientist and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the Naval Postgraduate School.
It is time for the United States to finish what it started when it overthrew the Taliban in 2001. The United States and NATO
must now proceed swiftly on multiple fronts simultaneously. The allies should increase their forces in Afghanistan, fortify
Afghan security forces, support tribal groups, strengthen local governance, and work with neighboring Pakistan to eliminate the
insurgent sanctuaries across the Afghan border.
U.S. intelligence agencies have identified terrorist plots stemming from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as perhaps the
single most important threat to the U.S. homeland. NATO’s reputation is also at stake over its first-ever involvement in ground
combat, and its credibility would be severely tarnished if it failed to stabilize Afghanistan.
There are more than 50,000 international troops in Afghanistan, along with more than 50,000 Afghan National Army soldiers.
The number of U.S. and NATO forces should rise by at least 28,000 until indigenous soldiers can fill those ranks. This will entail
making difficult choices, such as redeploying some U.S. forces from Iraq to Afghanistan.
At the same time, the United States and its allies must redouble their
efforts to build the Afghan security forces, particularly the police. In
most operations against al Qaeda, local police forces have greater
legitimacy and a better understanding of the environment than U.S.
forces have. But the Afghan National Police force is in disarray, is
incompetent, and is almost uniformly corrupt. Corruption is detrimental to the counterinsurgency campaign
because it diminishes the population’s support for its leaders. Based on the low quality of the Afghan police
in 2001, when the Taliban regime was overthrown, police reform there will take at least a decade, or until
2011. Persistence is essential to police reform.
In addition, security and stability in Afghanistan have historically required a balance between top-down
efforts to create a central government and bottom-up efforts to secure local support. Since 2001, the
United States and the international community have focused predominantly on top-down security efforts,
including the establishment of the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. But the deteriorating
situation and local nature of the insurgency now require Western support for local tribes, subtribes, and
clans to help establish order and governance.
Indeed, the United States and its allies must sharply augment their
efforts to improve the quality of local government, particularly in
rural regions. The poor security environment has kept reconstruction
and development efforts from reaching outlying areas. The lack of
roads, electricity, and water is a foremost concern of the population,
especially in rural areas. The counterinsurgency will be won or lost in
the rural communities of Afghanistan, not in urban centers such as Kabul. This means that the counterinsurgency must find
ways to reach rural communities despite security concerns.
Failing to eliminate the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan will cripple the efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Every
successful insurgency in Afghanistan since 1979 has enjoyed a safe haven in Pakistan and assistance from individuals within the Pakistani government, which must
now be convinced to undermine the sanctuaries on its own soil.
There is room for hope in Afghanistan. Many Afghans express optimism in the face of their country’s difficulties, and most Afghans still oppose the Taliban and other
insurgent groups. But support for the U.S. presence is dwindling. The key is to funnel sufficient resources and coordination through a narrowing window of
opportunity and to build Afghan capacity quickly. 
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